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Abstract
Adversarial robustness measures the susceptibility of a classifier to imperceptible perturbations
made to the inputs at test time. In this work we highlight the benefits of natural low rank
representations that often exist for real data such as images, for training neural networks with
certified robustness guarantees.
Our first contribution is for certified robustness to perturbations measured in `2 norm.
We exploit low rank data representations to provide improved guarantees over state-of-the-art
randomized smoothing-based approaches on standard benchmark datasets such as CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100.
Our second contribution is for the more challenging setting of certified robustness to pertur-
bations measured in `∞ norm. We demonstrate empirically that natural low rank representations
have inherent robustness properties, that can be leveraged to provide significantly better guaran-
tees for certified robustness to `∞ perturbations in those representations. Our certificate of `∞
robustness relies on a natural quantity involving the ∞→ 2 matrix operator norm associated
with the representation, to translate robustness guarantees from `2 to `∞ perturbations. A key
technical ingredient for our certification guarantees is a fast algorithm with provable guarantees
based on the multiplicative weights update method to provide upper bounds on the above matrix
norm. Our algorithmic guarantees improve upon the state of the art for this problem, and may
be of independent interest.
1 Introduction
It is now well established across several domains like images, audio and natural language, that
small input perturbations that are imperceptible to humans can fool deep neural networks at test
time [SZS+13, BCM+13, CW18, ERLD17]. This phenomenon known as adversarial robustness has
led to flurry of research in recent years (see Appendix 5 for a discussion of related work). Following
most prior work in this area [GSS14, MMS+17, ZYJ+19, SNG+19, WRK20], we will study the
setting where adversarial perturbations to an input x are measured in an `p norm (p = 2 or p =∞).
In this work, we study methods for certified adversarial robustness in the framework developed
in [LAG+19, CRK19]. The goal is to output a classifier f that on input x ∈ Rn outputs a prediction
y in the label space Y, along with a certified radius r(x). The classifier is guaranteed to be robust
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at x up to the radius rf (x) (with high probability), i.e., ∀z : ‖z‖p ≤ rf (x), f(x+ z) = f(x). For an
`p norm and ε > 0, the certified accuracy of a classifier f is defined as
acc(`p)ε (f) = P(x,y)∼D
[
f(x) = y and rf (x) ≥ ε
]
, (1)
where D is the underlying data distribution generating test inputs. We call the radius rf (x) returned
by the classifier as the certified radius on x. When ε = 0 this is the natural accuracy of f .
For certified adversarial robustness to `2 perturbations, the randomized smoothing procedure
proposed in [LAG+19, CRK19] is a simple and efficient method that can be applied to any neural
network. Randomized smoothing works by creating a smoothed version of a given classifier by
adding Gaussian noise to the inputs (see Section 2). The smoothed classifier exhibits certain
Lipschitzness properties, and one can derive good certified robustness guarantees from it. The study
of randomized smoothing for certified `2 robustness is an active research area and the current best
guarantees are obtained by incorporating the smoothed classifier into the training process [SYL+19]
(see Appendix 5).
It seems much more challenging to obtain certified adversarial robustness to `∞ perturba-
tions [RSL18, GDS+18, WK18]. In particular, the design of a procedure akin to randomized
smoothing has been difficult to achieve for `∞ perturbations. One approach to obtain certified
`∞ robustness is to translate a certified radius guarantee of ε for `2 perturbations (via randomized
smoothing) into an ε/
√
n certified radius guarantee for `∞ perturbations; here n is the dimensionality
of the ambient space. Furthermore, recent work [BDMZ20, YDH+20, KLGF20] has established
lower bounds proving that randomized smoothing based methods cannot break the above
√
n barrier
for `∞ robustness in the worst case.
However real data such as images are not worst case and often exhibits a natural low rank
structure. In this work we show how we can leverage such natural low-rank representations for
the data, in order to design algorithms based on randomized smoothing with improved certified
robustness guarantees for both `2 and `∞ perturbations.
Our Contributions. We now describe our main contributions.
Improved certified `2 robustness: Our first contribution is to design new smoothed classifiers for
achieving certified robustness to `2 perturbations. These classifiers achieve improved tradeoffs
between natural accuracy and certified accuracy at higher radii. We achieve this by leveraging
the existence of good low-rank representation for the data. We modify the randomized smoothing
approach to instead selectively inject more noise along certain directions, without compromising
the accuracy of the classifier. The large amount of noise leads to classifier that is less sensitive to
`2 perturbations, and hence achieves higher certified accuracy across a wide range of radii. We
empirically demonstrate the improvements obtained by our approach on image data in Section 2.
Fast algorithms for translating certified robustness guarantees from `2 to `∞: For the more challenging
setting of `∞ robustness we consider classifiers of the form f(Px) where P is an arbitrary linear map,
and f represents an arbitrary neural network. When translating certified robustness guarantees
for `2 perturbations to obtain guarantees for `∞ perturbations, the loss incurred is captured by
the ∞ → 2 operator norm of matrix P . While computing this operator norm is NP-hard, we
design a fast approximate algorithm based on the multiplicative weights update method with
provable guarantees. Our algorithmic guarantees give significant improvements over the best known
bounds [AHK05, Kal07] for this problem and may be of independent interest (see Section 3.1).
2
Certified `∞ robustness in natural data representations: Real data such as images have natural
representations that are often used in image processing e.g., via the Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT). Via an empirical study we highlight the need for achieving `∞ robustness in the DCT basis.
More importantly, we demonstrate that the representation in the DCT basis is robust, i.e., there
exist low rank projections that capture most of the signal in the data and that at the same time
have small ∞→ 2 operator norm.1 We develop a fast heuristic based on sparse PCA to find such
robust projections. When combined with our multiplicative weights based algorithm, this leads to
a new training procedure based on randomized smoothing. Our procedure can be applied to any
network architecture and provides stronger guarantees on robustness to `∞ perturbations in the
DCT basis.
2 Certified Robustness to `2 Perturbations
We build upon the randomized smoothing technique proposed in [LAG+19, CRK19] and further
developed in [SYL+19]. Consider a multiclass classification problem and a classifier f : Rn → Y,
where Y is the label set. Given f , randomized smoothing produces a smoothed classifier g where
g(x) = arg max
y∈Y
P(f(x+ δ) = y). (2)
Here δ ∼ N(0, σ2I) is the Gaussian noise added. The following proposition holds.
Proposition 2.1 ([LAG+19, CRK19]). Given a classifier f , let g be its smoothed version as defined
in (2) above. On an input x, and for δ ∼ N(0, σ2I) define yA := arg maxy P(f(x+ δ) = y), and let
pA = P(f(x+ δ) = yA). Then the prediction of g at x is unchanged up to `2 perturbations of radius
r(x) = σ2
(
Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)
)
. (3)
Here pB = maxy 6=yA P(f(x+ δ) = y) and Φ−1 is the inverse of the standard Gaussian CDF.
Hence, randomized smoothing provides a fast method to certify the robustness of any given
classifier on various inputs. In order to get robustness to large perturbations it is desirable to choose
the noise magnitude σ as large as possible. However, there is a natural tradeoff between the amount
of noise added and the natural accuracy of the classifier. As an example consider an input x ∈ Rn
of `2 length
√
n. If σ is the average amount of noise added then one is restricted to choosing σ to
be a small constant in order for the noise to not overwhelm the signal.
However, it is well known that natural data such as images are low dimensional in nature.
Figure 5 in Appendix A shows that for the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets, even when projected,
via PCA, onto 200 dimensions, the reconstruction error remains small. If the input is close to an
r-dimensional subspace, then it is natural to add noise only within the subspace for smoothing.
Formally, let Π be the projection matrix on to an r-dimensional subspace and x be such that
‖Πx‖2 ≈ ‖x‖2 =
√
n. For δ ∼ N(0, σ2I) we have ‖Πδ‖2 ≈ σ
√
r. Hence if we only add noise within
the subspace, then σ can be as large as
√
n/r as opposed to a constant without significantly affecting
the natural accuracy.
1This is also true for domains such as audio in the DCT basis. See Appendix F for experimental evidence.
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We formalize this into an efficient training algorithm as follows: we take a base classifier/neural
network f(x) and replace it with the smoothed classifier gΠ(x) where
gΠ(x) = arg max
y∈Y
P(f(Πx+ δΠ) = y). (4)
where Π is a projection matrix onto an r-dimensional subspace and δΠ is a standard Gaussian of
variance σ2 that lies within Π. For data such as images, good projections Π can be obtained via
methods like PCA. Furthermore, certifying the robustness of our proposed smoothed classifier can
be easily incorporated into existing pipelines for adversarial training with minimal overhead. In
particular using the rotational symmetry of Gaussian distributions it is easy to show the following
Proposition 2.2. Given a base classifier f : Rn → Y and a projection matrix Π, on any input x,
the smoothed classifier gΠ(x) as defined in (4) is equivalent to the classifier given by
g˜Π(x) = arg max
y∈Y
P(f
(
Π(x+ δ)
)
= y). (5)
Here δ is a standard Gaussian of variance σ2 in every direction.
Hence constructing our proposed smoothed classifier simply requires adding a linear transfor-
mation layer to any existing network architecture before training via randomized smoothing. We
propose to train the smoothed classifier as defined in (5) by minimizing its adversarial standard
cross entropy loss as proposed in [MMS+17]. However, since dealing with arg max is hard from an
optimization point of view, we follow the approach of [SYL+19] and instead minimize the cross
entropy loss of the following soft classifier
GΠ(x) = E
δ∼N(0,σ2I)
[f
(
Π(x+ δ)
)
]. (6)
This leads to the following objective where `ce is the standard cross-entropy objective and ε > 0 is
perturbation radius chosen for the training procedure.
arg min
f
E
(x,y)
[
max
z:‖z‖2≤ε
`ce(GΠ(x+ z), y)
]
. (7)
Following [MMS+17, SYL+19], the inner maximization problem of finding adversarial perturbations
is solved via projected gradient descent (PGD), and given the adversarial perturbations, the outer
minimization uses stochastic gradient descent. Overall, this leads to the following training procedure.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial training via projections
1: function RobustTrain(training data (x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym), subspace rank r, base noise mag-
nitude σ, λ ∈ [0, 1], number of steps T , mini batch size b)
2: Perform PCA on (unlabeled) data matrix A ∈ Rn×m to obtain a rank-r projection matrix Π.
3: Set GΠ as in (6) with σ = λ
√
n/r.
4: for t = 1, . . . , T do
5: Obtain a mini batch of b examples (xt1 , yt1), . . . , (xtb , ytb).
6: For each xti use projected gradient ascent on inner maximization in (7) to get x′ti .
7: Given perturbed examples {(x′ti , yti)}i∈[b], update network parameters via SGD.
8: Output the smoothed classifier g˜Π(x).
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Empirical Evaluation. We compare Algorithm 1 with the algorithm of [SYL+19] for various
values of σ and ε (used for training to optimize (7)). We choose ε ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0} and for
each ε we choose the value of σ as described in [SYL+19]. In each case, we train the classifier
proposed in [SYL+19] using a noise magnitude σ, and we train our proposed smoothed classifier
using higher noise values of λσ
√
n/r, where λ is a parameter that we vary. In all experiments, we
train a ResNet-32 network on the CIFAR-10 dataset by optimizing (7). Figure 1 shows a comparison
of certified accuracies for different radii and different values of λ. See Appendix A for a description
of the hyperparameters and additional experiments.
Figure 1: Plot of certified accuracy
achieved at different radii when differ-
ent values of λ are chosen to optimize
the smoothed classifier in (5). We com-
pare with the method of [SYL+19] The
plot is obtained by training a ResNet-32
architecture on CIFAR-10 with ε = 1.0.
Note that the y-intercept of each curve
represents the natural accuracy of the
corresponding classifier.
As can be seen from the figure, varying the value of λ lets us tradeoff lower accuracy at small
values of the radius for a significant gain in certified accuracy at higher radii as compared to the
method of [SYL+19]. In particular we find that choosing values of λ close to 0.5 leads to networks
that can certify accuracy at much higher radii with minimal to no loss in the natural accuracy as
compared to the approach of [SYL+19]. In Figure 2 we present the result of our training procedure
for various values of ε and σ and compare with the `2 smoothing method of [SYL+19] on the
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets. In each case, to obtain the projection matrix Π we perform a
PCA onto each image channel separately and use the top 200 principal components to obtain the
projection matrix Π. For both datasets, our trained networks outperform the method of [SYL+19]
across a large range of radius values. In particular, for higher values of radius (say, ' 0.5) our
method achieves a desired certified accuracy with significantly higher natural accuracy as compared
to the method of [SYL+19]. For instance in the CIFAR-10 dataset, at a radius of 1.0 and a desired
certified accuracy of at least 0.35, the method of [SYL+19] achieves a natural accuracy of ≈ 0.5
(yellow dotted curve at radius 0). In contrast our method achieves the same with a natural accuracy
of ≈ 0.65 (green solid curve at radius 0). On the other hand, at very small radius values the method
of [SYL+19] is better. This is expected as we suffer a small loss in natural accuracy due to the PCA
step in Algorithm 1.
3 Methods for Certified `∞ Robustness
We now describe our algorithms for the more challenging problem of certified robustness to `∞
perturbations in a given basis or representation. Our approach is to leverage the existence of
good representations of natural data measured by a certain robustness parameter, and translate `2
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Figure 2: A comparison of certified radius guarantees obtained via Algorithm 1 as compared to the
approach of [SYL+19]. The x-axis is the radius, and the y-axis represents the certified accuracy.
The top row describe results for the CIFAR-10 dataset – (left) certified accuracies for various values
of ε, (right) for ε = 0.5. Similarly, the bottom row describe the results for the CIFAR-100 dataset.
robustness guarantees from Section 2 to get certified `∞ guarantees. Consider classifiers f : Rn → Y
and g(x) := f(Px), where P ∈ Rn×n represents any linear map. The certified accuracy of g satisfies
∀ε > 0, acc(`∞)ε′ (g) ≥ acc(`2)ε (g) for 0 ≤ ε′ ≤ ε/‖P‖∞→2, where ‖P‖∞→2 = max
x:‖x‖∞≤1
‖Px‖2
is the ∞→ 2 operator norm of P and represents a robustness parameter (see Proposition B.2 for
a formal claim). Hence, to translate guarantees from `2 to `∞, we look for robust linear maps P
that have small ∞ → 2 operator norm. Our approach is inspired by the recent theoretical work
of [ACCV19], and finds a low-dimensional representation given by an (orthogonal) projection
matrix Π for the data that has small ‖Π‖∞→2 (choosing a projection matrix is almost without
loss of generality among contractive linear maps in a formal sense [ACCV19]). There is a nice
characterization for ‖Π‖∞→2 as the maximum `1 norm among Euclidean unit vectors in the subspace
of Π (this is a notion of sparsity of the vectors). For a rank r projector Π, the range of values taken
by ‖Π‖∞→2 is [
√
r,
√
n]. Hence if the projection is not low-rank and sparse, ‖Π‖∞→2 could be as
large as
√
n (e.g., when Π = I). This is consistent with the loss of
√
n factor in robustness radius to
`∞ perturbations for general datasets [BDMZ20, YDH+20]. Moreover as we have seen in Section 2,
good low-rank representations of the data also give stronger certified `2 robustness guarantees (and
in turn, stronger certified `∞ guarantees).
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Our goal is to find a good robust rank-r projection of the data if it exists. We propose a heuristic
based on sparse PCA [MBPS09] to find a robust low rank projection with low reconstruction error
(see Section 3.2). Since we aim for certified robustness, an important step in this approach is
to compute and certify an upper bound on ‖Π‖∞→2, for our candidate projection Π. This is an
NP-hard problem, related to computing the famous Grothendieck norm [AN04]. We describe a new,
scalable, approximate algorithm for computing upper bounds on ‖Π‖∞→2 with provable guarantees.
3.1 Certifying the ∞→ 2 operator norm.
Our fast algorithm is based on the multiplicative weights update (MWU) method for approximately
solving a natural semi-definite programming (SDP) relaxation, and produce a good upper bound
on ‖Π‖∞→2. Our upper bound also comes with a certificate from the dual SDP i.e., a short proof
of the correctness of the upper bound. Given a candidate Π our algorithm will compute an upper
bound for ‖Π‖∞→1 which by matrix norm duality satisfies
‖Π‖2∞→2 = ‖Π‖∞→1 = maxx x
>Πx subject to ‖x‖∞ ≤ 1. (8)
In fact our algorithm will work for the following more general problem of Quadratic Programming:
Given a symmetric matrix M with ∀i ∈ [n] : Mii ≥ 0, max
x:‖x‖∞≤1
x>Mx. (9)
The standard SDP relaxation for the problem (see (12) in Appendix C.1), has primal variables
represented by the positive semi-definite (PSD) matrix X ∈ Rn×n satisfying constraints Xii ≤ 1
for each i ∈ [n]. The SDP dual of this relaxation (given in (14) of Appendix C.1) has variables
y1, . . . , yn ≥ 0 corresponding to the n constraints in the primal SDP. Since the SDP is a valid
relaxation for (9), it provides an upper bound for ∞→ 1 operator norm2 . Classical results show
that it is always within a factor of pi/2 of the actual value of ‖M‖∞→1 [Nes98, AMMN06]. However,
it is computationally intensive to solve the SDP using off-the-shelf SDP solvers (even for CIFAR-10
images, X is 1024× 1024). We design a fast algorithm based on the multiplicative weight update
(MWU) framework [KL96, AHK05].
Description of the algorithm Our algorithm differs slightly from the standard MWU approach
for solving the above SDP. The algorithm below takes as input a matrix M and always returns a
valid upper bound upbdmin on the SDP value, along with a dual feasible solution yubmin that can act
as a certificate, and a candidate primal solution X that attains the same value (and is potentially
feasible). Theorem C.2 proves that for the right setting of parameters, particularly the number of
iterations Tf = O(n logn/δ3), the solution X is also guaranteed to be feasible up to small error
δ > 0.
2A fast algorithm that potentially finds a local optimum for the problem will not suffice for our purposes; we need
an upper bound on the global optimum.
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Algorithm 2 Fast Certification of ∞→ 1 norm and Quadratic Programming
1: function CertifySDP(M ∈ Rn×n, iteration bound Tf , slack δ, damping ρ)
2: Initialize α = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn. primal X = 0, dual y = 0n, upbdmin =∞, yubmin = 0n.
3: for t = 0, 1 . . . , T do
4: α˜← (1− δ)α+ δ(1, 1, . . . , 1).
5: λ← max-eigenvalue(diag(α˜)−1/2Mdiag(α˜)−1/2) and u ∈ Rn be its eigenvector.
6: v ← √n · diag(α˜)−1/2u, y ← 1t+1(ty + λα˜), X ← 1t+1(tX + vv>).
7: if ‖v‖∞ ≤ 1 + δ or maxiXii ≤ 1 + δ then, do early stop and return appropriate values.
8: Update ∀i ∈ [n], α(i)← α(i) exp ( δρ(v(i)2 − 1)), and renormalize s.t. ∑ni=1 α(i) = n.
9: if upbdmin > nλ, then set upbdmin = nλ and yubmin = y.
10: Output upbdmin, dual solution yubmin, and primal candidate X.
Recall that from (8) an estimate of the the ∞→ 1 norm immediately translates to an estimate
of the ∞→ 2 norm. In the above algorithm, there are weights given by α for n different constraints
of the form Xii ≤ 1. At each iteration, the algorithm maximizes the objective subject to one
constraint of the form ∑i α˜iXii ≤ n, where α˜ involves a small correction to α that is crucial to
ensure the run-time guarantees. The maximization is done using a maximum eigenvalue/eigenvector
computation. The weights α are then updated using a multiplicative update based on the violation
of the solution found in the current iterate. The damping factor ρ determines the rate of progress of
the iterations – the smaller the value of ρ the faster the progress, but a very small value may lead
to oscillations. A more aggressive choice of ρ compared to the one in Theorem 3.1 seems to work
well in practice. Finally, we remark that for every choice of α and ρ we get a valid upper bound
(due to dual feasibility). We show the following guarantee for our algorithm for the more general
problem of (9).
Theorem 3.1. Suppose δ > 0, and M be any symmetric matrix with Mii ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n]. For any
α ∈ Rn≥0 with
∑n
i=1 α(i) = n, if λ = λmax
(
(diag(α)−1/2Mdiag(α)−1/2)
)
, then y = λα is feasible for
the dual SDP and gives a valid upper bound of nλ on the objective value for the SDP relaxation to
(9). Moreover Algorithm 2 on input M , with parameters δ and ρ = O(n/δ) after T = O(n logn/δ3)
iterations finds a feasible SDP solution X̂  0 and a feasible dual solution ŷ ∈ Rn that both sandwich
the optimal SDP value within a 1 + δ factor.
(See Prop C.1 and Theorem C.2 in Appendix C.1 for formal statements along with proofs. )
Each iteration only involves a single maximum eigenvalue computation, which can be done up to
(1 + δ) accuracy in Teig = O˜(m/δ) time where m is the number of non-zeros in M (see e.g., [KL96]).
To the best of our knowledge, this gives significant improvements over the prior best bound of
O˜(n1.5m/δ2.5) runtime for solving the above SDP [AHK05, Kal07]. Our algorithm and analysis
differs from the general MWU framework [Kal07] by treating the objective differently from the
constraints so that the “width parameter” does not depend on the objective. A crucial step in our
algorithm and proof is to add a correction term of O(δ) to the weights in each step that ensures
that the potential violation of each constraint in an iteration is bounded. In addition our algorithm
is more scalable than existing off-the-shelf methods. See Appendix C.1 and E for details and
comparisons.
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3.2 Finding Robust Low-rank Representations
We now show how to find a good low-rank robust projections when it exists in the given representation.
Given a dataset A, our goal is to find a (low-rank) projection Π that gets small reconstruction
error ‖A−ΠA‖2F , while ensuring that ‖Π‖∞→2 is small. Awasthi et al. [ACCV19] formulate this
as an optimization problem that is NP-hard, but show polynomial time algorithms based on the
Ellipsoid algorithm that gives constant factor approximations. However, the algorithm is impractical
in practice because of the Ellipsoid algorithm, and the separation oracle used by it (that in turn
involves solving an SDP). We instead use the connection to sparsity described in Section 3 to devise
a much faster heuristic based on sparse PCA to find a good projection Π (see (B.4) in the appendix
for a formal justification). We just use an off-the-shelf heuristic for sparse PCA (the scikit-learn
sparse PCA implementation [PVG+11] based on [MBPS09]), along with our certification procedure
Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 3 Find a Robust Projection
1: function RobustProjection(data A ∈ Rm×n, rank k, reconstruction error δ)
2: Set M := (A>A)/tr(A>A). Initialize Π̂← ∅, κ̂ =∞.
3: for different values of r ≤ k do
4: Find r-PCA of the M to get a rank r projection Π1. M ′ ←M −Π1MΠ1
5: Run sparse PCA on M ′ to find a rank (k − r) projection Π2. Set Π = Π1 + Π2.
6: Run CertifySDP(Π, δ = 1/4, ρ) to get an upper bound κ.
7: if κ < κ̂ and if 〈M, I −Π〉 ≤ δ then
8: Π̂← Π, κ̂ = κ.
9: Output Π̂, κ̂.
4 Training Certified `∞ Robust Networks in Natural Representa-
tions.
Building upon our theoretical results from the previous section we now demonstrate that for natural
representations, one can indeed achieve better certified robustness to `∞ perturbations by translating
guarantees from certified `2 robustness. We focus on image data, and study the representation of
images in the DCT basis. Before we describe the details of our training and certification procedure for
`∞ robustness, we provide further empirical evidence that imperceptibility in natural representations
such as the DCT basis is a desirable property.
Study of imperceptibility in DCT basis. We argue that for adversarial perturbations to be
imperceptible to humans they should be of small magnitude in the DCT representation (perhaps in
addition to being small in the pixel basis). We take images from the CIFAR-10 dataset and transform
them into the DCT basis. We then add sparse random perturbations to them. In particular, for
a sparsity parameter k, we pick k coordinates in the DCT basis at random and add a random
perturbation with `∞ norm of ck/
√
k where ck ≈ ε
√
n is chosen such that the perturbed images are
ε ≤ 0.09 away from the unperturbed images in the pixel space. Notice that for small values of k, a
perturbation of large `∞ norm is added. Figure 3 visualizes the perturbed images for different values
of k. As seen, large perturbations in the DCT basis lead to visually perceptible changes, even if they
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Figure 3: Original images (leftmost) from the CIFAR-10 dataset and their perturbed versions when
sparse random perturbations are added in the DCT basis with sparsity k. Large perturbations in
the DCT basis (e.g., k = 1 ) lead to perceptible changes in the pixel space though they are `∞
perturbations of ε ≤ 0.09. As k increases the imperceptibility of the perturbed images improves.
are (ε ≤ 0.09-)close in the pixel basis. For comparison we also include in Appendix D imperceptible
adversarial examples for these images that were generated via the PGD based method of [MMS+17]
on a ResNet-32 network trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset for robustness to `∞ perturbations of
magnitude ε = 0.09. This further motivates studying robustness in natural data representations.
Training certified `∞ robust networks in the DCT basis. The methods developed in
Section 3 and 2 together give algorithms for training classifiers with certified `∞ robustness.
However while we want `∞ robustness in a different representation U (e.g., in the DCT basis), it
may still be more convenient to use off-the-shelf methods for performing the training in the original
representation X ⊆ Rn (e.g., pixel representation). Let the orthogonal matrix O ∈ Rn×n represent
the DCT transformation. Consider an input x ∈ X and let u = Ox ∈ U be its DCT representation,
where U is the space of images in the DCT basis. It is easy to see that functions f : X → Y and
g : U → Y given by g(u) := f(O−1u) = f(x) have the same certified accuracy to `2 perturbations.
Moreover if the classifier g satisfies g(u) = g(Πu) for some projection Π, the robust accuracy of g to
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`∞ perturbations in the representation U satisfies (see Proposition B.3 in appendix)
acc(`∞)ε′ (g) ≥ acc(`2)ε (f), for any ε > 0, 0 ≤ ε′ ≤ ε/‖Π‖∞→2. (10)
Figure 4: A comparison of certified `∞ accuracy (y-axis) in the DCT basis of our method to that
of [SYL+19], for different values of ε and with different certified radii on the x-axis, for λ = 0.5.
The left and right plots describe results for the CIFAR-10 and the CIFAR-100 datasets respectively.
Experimental Data. We evaluate our approach on the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets. From
(10), it is sufficient to train a classifier in the original pixel space with an appropriate projection
Π′ = OΠ. Hence, we train a smoothed classifier as defined in (2) using Algorithm 1. To obtain
the required Π, we first use the sparse PCA based heuristic (Algorithm 3) to find a projection
matrix of rank 200 for the three image channels separately. We then use Algorithm 2 to compute
upper bounds on the ∞→ 2 operator norm of the projections matrices. Finally, we combine the
obtained projection matrices from each channel to obtain a projection Π. Table 1 shows the values
of the operator norms certified by our algorithm for each image channel and for the combined
projection matrix. Notice the obtained subspaces have operator norm values significantly smaller
than
√
n = 55.42. The reconstruction error in each case, when projected onto Π is at most 0.0345.
Dataset R G B Π
CIFAR-10 17.45 17.51 17.39 30.22
CIFAR-100 17.22 17.33 17.37 29.97
Table 1: The table shows bounds on ∞ →
2 norm for projection matrices obtained by
Algorithm 2 on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
training sets.
After training, on an input x we obtain a cer-
tified radius for `∞ perturbations in the DCT ba-
sis by obtaining a certified `2 radius of ε via ran-
domized smoothing and then dividing the obtained
value by ‖Π‖∞→2. We compare with the approach
of [SYL+19] for training a smoothed classifier with-
out projections. Since the classifier of [SYL+19] does
not involve projections, we translate the resulting
`2 robustness guarantee into an `∞ guarantee by
dividing with
√
n = 55.42 as is done in [SYL+19]. Figure 4 shows that across a range of training
parameters, our proposed approach via robust projections leads to significantly higher certified
accuracy to `∞ perturbations in the DCT basis.
5 Related Work
Several recent works have aimed to design algorithms that are robust to adversarial perturbations.
This is a rapidly growing research area, and here we survey the works most relevant in the context
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of the current paper.
In practice, first order methods are a popular choice for adversarial training. Algorithms such as
the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [GSS14] and projected gradient descent (PGD) [MMS+17]
fall into this category. These methods are appealing since they are generally applicable to many
network architecture and only rely on black box access to gradient information. Recent works have
aimed to improve upon the scalability and runtime efficiency of the above approaches [ZYJ+19,
SNG+19, WRK20]. While these methods can be used to gather evidences regarding the robustness
of a classifier to first order attacks, i.e., those based on gradient information, they do not exclude
the possibility of a stronger attack that can significantly degrade their performance.
There have been recent works studying the problem of efficiently certifying the adversarial robust-
ness of classifiers from both empirical and theoretical perspectives [CAH18, WCAJ11, WPW+18,
GMDC+18, MGV18, SGM+18, WZC+18, ZWC+18, ADV19]. For the case of certifying robust-
ness to `∞ perturbations, recent works have explored linear programming (LP) and semi-definite
programming (SDP) based approaches to produce lower bounds on the certified robustness of
neural networks. Such approaches have seen limited success beyond shallow (depth at most 4)
networks [RSL18, WK18]. These works use convex programming (including SDPs) to directly
provide an upper bound on the objective that corresponds to finding an adversarial perturbation
for a given classifier f on input x. While our multiplicative weights method also approximately
solves a convex program (specifically, an SDP), we use the convex program to translate certified `2
robustness guarantees to certified `∞ guarantees in a black box manner.
Another line of work has focused on methods for certifying robustness via propagating interval
bounds [GDS+18]. While these methods have seen recent success in scaling up to large networks,
they typically cannot be applied in a black box manner and require access to the structure of the
underlying network.
Randomized smoothing proposed in the works of [LCZH18, LAG+19, CRK19, CG17] is a simple
and effective way to certify robustness of neural networks to `2 perturbations. These methods work by
creating a smoothed classifier by adding Gaussian noise to inputs. The improved Lipschitzness of the
smoothed classifier can then be translated to bounds on certified `2 robustness. Other recent works
have also proposed developing Lipschitz classifiers in order to get improved robustness [YRZ+20].
The recent work of [SYL+19], that we build upon, shows that by incorporating the smoothed
classifier into the training process, one can get state-of-the art results for certified `2 robustness.
The recent works of [LCWC19, DGS+18, YDH+20] extends the work of [SYL+19] by developing
smoothing based methods for other `p norms and noise distribution other than the Gaussian
distribution. The authors in [SSY+20] explore smoothing based methods for making a pretrained
classifier certifiably robust.
While smoothing based methods have been successful for providing robustness to `2 perturbations,
they have not demonstrated the same benefits for for the more challenging setting of robustness to
`∞ perturbations. The recent works of [BDMZ20, YDH+20, KLGF20] have provided lower bounds
demonstrating that smoothing based methods are unlikely to yield benefits for robustness to `∞
perturbations in the worst case.
Fast approximate SDP algorithms. Our certification algorithm is based on the multiplicative
weights update (MWU) framework applied to the problem of Quadratic Programming. Klein
and Lu [KL96] gave the first MWU-based algorithm for solving particular semidefinite programs
(SDP). They used the framework of [PST91] for solving convex programs to give a faster algorithm
for solving the maxcut SDP within a 1 + δ approximation using O˜(n) eigenvalue/eigenvector
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computations, where the O˜ hides polylogarithmic factors in n and polynomial factors in 1/δ. But
the analysis of Klein and Lu [KL96] is specialized for the Max-Cut problem, which is a special
case of (11) where M is a graph Laplacian; it does not directly extend to our more general setting
(they use diagonal dominance of a Laplacian to get a small bound on the width). Arora, Hazan
and Kale [AHK05, Kal07] introduced a more general framework for solving semidefinite programs.
In particular, they showed how when this framework is applied to the problem of Quadratic
Programming, it gives a running time bound of O(n1.5
δ2.5 ·min {m,n1.5/(δα∗) }), where the optimal
solution value is SDPval = α∗‖M‖1, and m is the number of non-zeros of matrix M . For SDPs of
the form (12), the width parameter could be reasonably large and could result in Ω˜(n3/2) iterations
(see Section 6.3 of [Kal07]). To the best of our knowledge this represents the prior best running time
for approximately solving the Quadratic Programming SDP (9), and is most related to our work.
Arora et al. [AK07] also gave primal-dual based algorithms near-linear time algorithms for
several combinatorial problems like max-cut and sparsest cut that use semidefinite programming
relaxations. Iyengar et al. [IPS11, JY11, AZLO16] consider positive covering and packing SDPs
like max-cut, and give fast approximate algorithms based on the multiplicative weights method. In
particular, [JY11, AZLO16, JLL+20] and several other works give parallel algorithms, where the
iteration count only has a mild polylogarithmic dependence on width for solving these positive SDPs.
This uses the matrix multiplicative weights method that involves computing matrix exponentials.
Quadratic Programming does not fall into this class of problems in general, unless M  0. A
very recent paper of Lee and Padmanabhan [LP19] gives algorithms that work for problems like
quadratic programming with diagonal constraints; however this gives an additive approximation
to the objective which does not suffice for our purposes. Moreover, our algorithm is very simple
and practical, and each iteration only uses a single computation of the largest eigenvalue. Hence,
analyzing this algorithm is interesting in its own right. Finally, interior point methods, cutting plane
methods and the Ellipsoid algorithm find solutions to the SDP that have much better dependence
on the accuracy δ e.g., a polynomial in log(1/δ) dependence, at the expense of significantly higher
dependence on n [Ali95, LSW15].
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown significant benefits in leveraging natural structure that exists in
real-world data e.g., low-rank or sparse representations, for obtaining certified robustness guarantees
under both `2 perturbations and `∞ perturbations in natural data representations. Our experiments
involving imperceptibility in the DCT basis for images suggest that further study of `∞ robustness
for other natural basis (apart from the co-ordinate basis) would be useful for different data domains
like images, audio etc. We also gave faster algorithms for approximately solving semi-definite
programs for quadratic programming (with provable guarantees that improve the state-of-the-art),
to obtain certified `∞ robustness guarantees. Such problem-specific fast approximate algorithms for
powerful algorithmic techniques like SDPs and other convex relaxations may lead to more scalable
certification procedures with better guarantees. Finally it would be interesting to see if our ideas
and techniques involving the ∞ → 2 operator norm can be adapted into the training phase, in
order to achieve better certified `∞ robustness in any desired basis without compromising much on
natural accuracy.
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A Additional experiments for certified `2 robustness
We first discuss the setting of the hyperparameters in our experiments. The experiments in Figure 1,
Figure 2, and Figure 4 were obtained by training a ResNet-32 architecture [HZRS16]. In each
case we optimize the objective in (7) with a starting learning rate of 0.1 and decaying the learning
rate by a factor of 0.1 every 50 epochs. Each model was trained for 150 epochs. We follow the
methodology of [SYL+19] and approximate the soft classifier in (5) by drawing 4 noise vectors from
the Gaussian distribution N(0, σ2I) and optimizing the inner maximization in (7) via 10 steps of
projected gradient descent. When training the method of [SYL+19] we choose the value of σ to
be 0.12 for ε = 0.25, 0.5. For ε = 0.75 and ε = 1.0, we choose σ to be 0.25 and 0.5 respectively.
When training our procedure in Algorithm 1 we use a higher noise of σ · λ√d/r, where σ is the
corresponding noise used for the method of [SYL+19], d = 1024 and r = 200. We vary the parameter
λ as discussed in Section 2. Empirically, we find that λ = 0.5 gives the best results.
We first demonstrate that real data such as images have a natural low rank structure. As an
illustration, Figure 5 shows the relative reconstruction error for the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
[KH+09] datasets, when each of the three channels is projected onto subspaces of varying dimensions,
computed via principal component analysis (PCA). As can be seen, even when projected onto 200
dimensions, the reconstruction error remains small.
Figure 5
Next we provide in Figure 6 a more fine grained comparison between our procedure in Algorithm 1
and the method of [SYL+19] by separately comparing the performance of the two methods for
different values of ε on the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets.
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Figure 6: A comparison of certified radius guarantees obtained via Algorithm 1 as compared to the
approach of [SYL+19]. The x-axis is the radius, and the y-axis represents the certified accuracy.
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B Simple Theoretical Propositions and Proofs
The following proposition shows the equivalence between the smoothed classifiers in (4) and (5).
Proposition B.1. Given a base classifier f : Rn → Y and a projection matrix Π, on any input x,
the smoothed classifier gΠ(x) as defined in (4) is equivalent to the classifier given by
g˜Π(x) = arg max
y∈Y
P(f
(
Π(x+ δ)
)
= y).
Here δ is a standard Gaussian of variance σ2 in every direction.
Proof. Let Π be a projection matrix with the corresponding subspace denoted by S. Let δ be
a random variable distributed as N(0, σ2I) and δΠ be a standard normal random variable with
variance σ2 within S and variance 0 outside. From the property of Gaussian distributions we
have that projections of a spherical Gaussian random variable with variance σ2 in each direction
are themselves Gaussian random variables with variance σ2 in each direction within the subspace.
Hence, for a fixed input x, the random variables Πx+ δΠ and Πx+ Πδ are identically distributed.
From this we conclude that the classifier
gΠ(x) = arg max
y∈Y
P(f(Πx+ δΠ) = y).
is identical to the classifier g˜Π(x).
The following proposition shows how to obtain an `∞ robustness guarantee from an `2 robustness
guarantee.
Proposition B.2. Consider any classifier f : Rn → Y, and let the classifier g(x) := f(Px), where
P ∈ Rn×n is any matrix. Then if we denote by r2(x), r∞(x) the radius of robustness measured in `2
and `∞ norm respectively of g around a point x ∈ Rn. Then we have
r∞(x) ≥ r2(x)‖P‖∞→2 , where ‖P‖∞→2 = maxx:‖x‖∞≤1‖Px‖2.
Hence for any ε ≥ 0, we have acc(`∞)ε′ (g) ≥ acc(`2)ε (g), for all 0 ≤ ε′ ≤ ε/‖P‖∞→2.
Proof. Consider any perturbation x′ = x+ z where ‖z‖∞ ≤ ε′ such that the predictions given by
g(x′) = f(Px′) and g(x) = f(Px) differs. Note that g(x′) = f(P (x+z)) = f(Px+z′) where z′ = Pz.
Moreover ‖z′‖2 ≤ ‖P‖∞→2ε′. Hence g is not robust at x up to an `2 radius of ε = ε′‖P‖∞→2, as
required.
The following simple proposition shows how to obtain certified robustness guarantees in the
representation U e.g., DCT basis by performing appropriate training in another representation X
e.g., the co-ordinate or pixel basis. Let O ∈ Rn×n represent an orthogonal matrix that represents the
DCT transformation i.e., for an input x ∈ X ⊆ Rn let ψ(x) = Ox represents its DCT representation
(hence U = ψ(X )).
Proposition B.3. Suppose X ,U = ψ(X ) be defined as above. For any classifier g : U → Y,
consider the classifier f : X → Y obtained as f = g(Ox) where O is an orthogonal matrix. For
a point x ∈ X if we denote by r(`2)f (x) the radius of robustness of f at x measured in `2 norm,
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then we have that r(`2)g (Ox) = r(`2)f (x). Moreover suppose the classifier g(u) = g(Πu) ∀u ∈ U , for
some projection matrix Π, then the robust accuracy of g to `∞ perturbations in the representation U
satisfies acc(`∞)ε′ (g) ≥ acc(`2)ε (f) for any ε > 0 and ε′ ≤ ε/‖Π‖∞→2.
Proof. We will prove by contradiction. Let u, u′ ∈ ψ(X ) and let u′ = u + δu be an adversarial
perturbation of u with ‖δu‖2 = r. Let x = O−1u, and let x′ = O−1u′; note that x, x′ exist since
u, u′ ∈ ψ(X ). Moreover ‖x− x′‖2 = ‖u− u′‖2 since O is a rotation (orthogonal matrix). Hence x′
is an adversarial example for f at x, at a `2 distance of δu. This shows that r(`2)g (Ox) ≥ r(`2)f (x). A
similar argument also shows that r(`2)g (Ox) ≤ r(`2)f (x). The last part of the proposition follows by
applying Proposition B.2.
The following simple fact relates the ∞→ 2 operator norm and the `1 sparsity of a projection
matrix. This justifies the use of `1 sparsity as an approximate relaxation or proxy for ‖Π‖∞→2.
Fact B.4. For any (orthogonal) projection matrix Π ∈ Rn×n of rank r, we have
‖Π‖1
r
≤ ‖Π‖2∞→2 = ‖Π‖∞→1 ≤ ‖Π‖1,
where ‖Π‖1 refers to the entry-wise `1 norm of Π.
Proof. First we show the upper bound
‖Π‖∞→1 = max
y,z∈Rn:‖y‖∞≤1,‖z‖∞≤1
〈Π, yz>〉 ≤
∑
i,j
|Π(i, j)| = ‖Π‖1.
We now show the lower bound. Let Π = ∑ri=1 viv>i , where { vi : i ∈ [r] } represents an orthonormal
basis for the subspace given by Π. We have from the monotonicity of ∞→ 1 operator norm shown
in [ACCV19] that
‖Π‖∞→1 =
∥∥∥ r∑
i=1
viv
>
i
∥∥∥
∞→1
≥ max
i∈[r]
‖viv>i ‖∞→1 = max
i∈[r]
‖viv>i ‖1
≥ 1
r
∑
i∈[r]
‖viv>i ‖1 ≥
1
r
∥∥∥ ∑
i∈[r]
viv
>
i
∥∥∥
1
= ‖Π‖1
r
,
where the last inequality uses the triangle inequality for matrix operator norms.
C Translating certified adversarial robustness from `2 to `∞ per-
turbations
C.1 Certifying the ∞→ 2 operator norm
We now describe our efficient algorithmic procedure that gives a certifies an upper bound on the
∞ → 2 norm of the given matrix. Moreover, as we will see in Theorem C.2, our algorithmic
procedure comes with provable guarantees: it is guaranteed to output a value that is only a small
constant factor off from the global optimum i.e., true value of the ∞→ 2 norm.
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For any matrix A, we first note that ‖A‖2∞→2 = ‖A>A‖∞→1. Moreover, by the variational
characterization of operator norms, we have for M = AA>  0
‖A‖2∞→2 = max
x:‖x‖∞≤1
max
y:‖y‖∞≤1
x>My = max
x:‖x‖∞≤1
x>Mx. (11)
As stated in Section 3, our algorithm will apply to the more general problem (9) where Mii ≥ 0
for all i ∈ [n].
Given a symmetric matrix M with ∀i ∈ [n] : Mii ≥ 0, max
x:‖x‖∞≤1
x>Mx.
Note that this is certainly satisfied by all M  0. We consider the following standard SDP
relaxation (12) for the problem, where M  0. The primal variables are represented by the
positive semi-definite (PSD) matrix X ∈ Rn×n. The SDP dual of this relaxation, given in (14), has
variables y1, . . . , yn ≥ 0 corresponding to the n constraints (13). In what follows, for matrices M,X,
〈M,X〉 := tr(M>X) represents the trace inner product.
Primal SDP: max
X
〈M,X〉 (12)
s.t. Xii ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [n] (13)
X  0.
Dual SDP: min
y
∑
i∈[n]
yi (14)
s.t. diag(y) M (15)
y ≥ 0.
Let us denote by SDPval the value of the optimal solution to the primal SDP (12). Recall
that our algorithm goal is to output a value that is guaranteed to be a valid upper bound for
‖A‖2∞→2 = ‖M‖∞→1.3 The above primal SDP (12) is a valid relaxation, and it is also tight up to
a factor of pi/2 i.e., (2/pi)SDPval ≤ ‖M‖∞→1 ≤ SDPval. Moreover by weak duality, any feasible
solution to the dual SDP (14) gives a valid upper bound for the primal SDP value, and hence
‖M‖∞→1. However, the above SDP is computationally intensive to solve using off-the-shelf SDP
solvers (even for CIFAR-10 images, X is 1024× 1024) . Instead we design an algorithm based on
the multiplicative weight update (MWU) framework for solving SDPs [KL96, AHK05].
Our algorithm is described in Algorithm 2 of Section 3. Our algorithm differs from the standard
MWU approach (and analysis) [Kal07] treats the constraints (13) and the objective (12) similarly.
Firstly, by treating the objective differently from the constraints, we ensure that the width of the
convex program is smaller; in particular, the “width” parameter does not depend on the value of
the objective function anymore. This allows us to get a better convergence guarantee. Secondly, we
always maintain a dual feasible solution that gives a valid upper bound on the objective value (this
also allows us to do an early stop if appropriate). We remark that for every choice of α (and the
update rule), valcurr = nλ gives a valid upper bound (due to dual feasibility). This is encapsulated
in the following simple proposition where SDPval refers to the optimal solution value of the (12).
Proposition C.1. For any α ∈ Rn≥0 with
∑n
i=1 α(i) = n, if λ is the maximum eigenvalue
λ = λmax
(
(diag(α)−1/2Mdiag(α)−1/2)
)
, then we have SDPval ≤ nλ,
and y = λα is feasible for the dual SDP (14) and attains an objective value of nλ.
3Hence a fast algorithm that potentially finds a local optimum for the problem will not suffice for our purposes; we
need an upper bound on the global optimum of (11).
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Proof. Consider y = λα. Firstly, the dual objective value at y is ∑ni=1 yi = λ∑i α(i) = nλ, as
required. Moreover y ≥ 0, since the α ≥ 0. Finally, (15) is satisfied since by definition of λ,
diag(α)−1/2Mdiag(α)−1/2  λ · I =⇒ M  λ · diag(α) = diag(y),
by pre-multiplying and post-multiplying by diag(α)1/2. Finally, from weak duality SDPval ≤ nλ.
Analysis of the algorithm We show the following guarantee for our algorithm.
Theorem C.2. For any δ > 0, any symmetric matrix M with Mii ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n] , Algorithm 2 on
input M , with parameters δ and ρ = O(n/δ) after T = O(n logn/δ3) iterations finds a solution
X̂ ∈ Rn×n and ŷ ∈ Rn such that
(a) ŷ is feasible for the dual SDP (14) such that 〈M, X̂〉 = ∑ni=1 yi.
(b) X̂  0, X̂ii ≤ 1 + δ for all i ∈ [n], and 〈M, X̂〉 ≥ SDPval, the primal SDP value.
The above Theorem C.2 and Proposition C.1 together imply Theorem 3.1. We remark that the
O˜(n logn) ·Teig running time guarantee almost matches the guarantees for Klein and Lu for Max-Cut
SDP [KL96] (up to a O(1/δ) factor), but our guarantees apply to the SDP for the more general
Quadratic Programming problem. Note that the maximum eigenvalue can be computed within δ
accuracy in O(m/δ) time where m is the number of non-zeros ofM , (see e.g., [KL96] for a proof and
use in MWU framework). To the best of our knowledge, the best known algorithm prior to our work
for solving the SDP to this general Quadratic Programming problem (or even problem (11)) is by
Arora, Hazan and Kale [AHK05, Kal07] who give a O(n1.5
δ2.5 ·min {m,n1.5/(δα∗) }), where the optimal
solution value is SDPval = α∗‖M‖1. Compared to our algorithm’s running time of O˜(nm logn),
even when α∗ = Ω(1) the previous best requires a running time of O˜(n1.5 min {m,n1.5) }); but it
can even be the case that α∗ = O(1/n) [CW04]. Finally recall that upper bound given by the SDP
is only off by a factor of pi/2 for PSD matrices, that is the best possible assuming P 6= NP (for
general matrices the approximation factor could be O(logn)) [Nes98, CW04, AMMN06, BGG+18].
The analysis closely mirrors the analysis of the Multiplicative Weights algorithm for solving SDPs
due to Klein and Lu [KL96], and Arora, Hazan and Kale [AHK05, Kal07]. The main parameter
that affects the running time of the multiplicative weights update method is the width parameter
ρ′ of the SDP constraints. The analysis of Klein and Lu [KL96] is specialized for the Max-Cut
problem (which is a special case of (11) where M is a graph Laplacian), where they achieve a
bound of O(n logn/δ2) eigenvalue computations. However their analysis does not directly extend to
our more general setting (they crucially use the fact that the optimum solution value is at least
Ω(tr(M)) to get a small bound on the width). In the more general framework of [AHK05], the
optimization problem is first converted into a feasibility problem (hence the objective also becomes
a constraint). For SDPs of the form (12), the width parameter could be reasonably large and could
result in Ω(n3/2) iterations (see Section 6.3 of [Kal07]). In our analysis, we ensure that the width is
small by treating the objective separately from the constraints. A crucial step of our algorithm is
introducing an amount δ to each of the weights which solving the eigenvalue maximization in each
step. This correction term of δ is important in getting an upper bound on the violation of each
constraint, and hence the width of the program. Finally, we present a slightly different analysis
using the SDP dual, that has the additional benefit of providing a certificate of optimality.
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Proof of Theorem C.2. Let at step t of the iteration, α(t) be the weight vector, X(t) be the
candidate SDP solution and y(t) be the candidate dual solution maintained by the Algorithm 2 in
step 6. Also α˜(t) := (1− δ)α(t) + δ1, where 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1). It is easy to see that
∀t ≤ T, X(t) = 1
t
t∑
`=1
v(`)(v(`))>, and y(t) = 1
t
t∑
`=1
λ(`)α˜(`).
We first establish the following lemma, which immediately implies part (a) of the theorem
statement.
Lemma C.3. For all t ≤ T , y(t) is feasible for the dual SDP (14), and 〈M,X(t)〉 = ∑i y(t)i .
Proof. We first check feasibility of the dual solution. First note that in every iteration t ∈ [T ],
α˜(t) ≥ 0 and λ(t) ≥ 0. The latter is because tr(diag(α˜(t))−1/2Mdiag(α˜(t))−1/2) ≥ 0 as all the diagonal
entries of M are non-negative, and hence λmax(diag(α˜(t))−1/2Mdiag(α˜(t))−1/2) ≥ 0. Hence y(t) ≥ 0.
Moreover, by definition of λ(t)
M  λ(`) · diag(α˜(`)) ∀` ≤ T, ( since diag(α˜(t))−1/2Mdiag(α˜(t))−1/2  λ(t)I),
M  1
t
t∑
`=1
λ(`) · diag(α˜(`)) = 1
t
t∑
`=1
diag(y(`)).
Finally, we establish 〈M,X(t)〉 = ∑i y(t)i . Note that by definition v(`) = √ndiag(α˜(`))−1/2u(`),
where u(`) is the top eigenvector of (diag(α˜)−1/2Mdiag(α˜)−1/2), and λ(`) is its eigenvalue. Hence
〈M,X(t)〉 = 1
t
t∑
`=1
〈M, v(`)(v(`))>〉 = 1
t
t∑
`=1
(v(`))>Mv(`)
= n1
t
t∑
`=1
(
(u(`))>diag(α˜(`))−1/2Mdiag(α˜(`))−1/2u(`)
)
= 1
t
t∑
`=1
λ(`) · n
On the other hand,
n∑
i=1
y
(t)
i =
n∑
i=1
1
t
t∑
`=1
λ(`)α˜(`)(i) = 1
t
t∑
`=1
λ(`) ·
n∑
i=1
α˜(`)(i) = 1
t
t∑
`=1
λ(`) · n.
This proves the lemma.
We now complete the proof of Theorem C.2.
Proof. Recall that X̂ = X(T ), ŷ = y(T ). Consider the SDP solution X ′ = 11+δ X̂. From Lemma C.3,
we see that y(T ) is feasible and
〈M,X ′〉 = 11 + δ 〈M, X̂〉 =
1
1 + δ
n∑
i=1
ŷ(i) ≥ 11 + δ · SDPval,
where the last inequality follows from weak duality of the SDP. Hence it suffices to show that X ′ is
feasible i.e., X̂ii ≤ 1 + δ for all i ∈ [n].
We prove maxi∈[n] X̂ii ≤ 1 + δ by following the same multiplicative weight analysis in [Kal07]
(see Section 2, Theorem 5), but only restricted to the n constraints of the form Xii ≤ 1.
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There is one expert for each i ∈ [n] corresponding to the constraint Xii ≤ 1. At each iteration
t, we consider a probability distribution p(t) = 1nα(t). The loss of expert i at time t is given by
m(t)(i) = 1ρ(1− (v
(t)
i )2) for ρ = n/δ . We note that in each iteration `,∑
i
(α(t)i + δ)(v
(t)
i )2 ≤ n =⇒ ∀i ∈ [n], (v(t)i )2 ≤
n
δ
≤ ρ
Hence 1
ρ
≥ m(t)i =
1
ρ
(
1− (v(t)i )2
)
≥ −(n/δ − 1)
ρ
≥ −1.
From the guarantees of the multiplicative weight update method (see Section 2, Theorem 2 of
[Kal07]), we have for each i ∈ [n]
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
m
(t)
i p
(t)
i ≤
T∑
t=1
m
(t)
i + δ
T∑
t=1
|m(t)i |+
lnn
δ
= (1− δ)
T∑
t=1
m
(t)
i + 2δ
∑
t∈[T ]
m
(t)
i >0
|m(t)i |+
lnn
δ
≤ (1 + δ)
ρ
T∑
t=1
(
1− (v(t)i )2
)
+ 2δ
ρ
+ lnn
δ
ρ
T
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
m
(t)
i p
(t)
i ≤ (1− δ) · (1− X̂ii) + 2δ +
ρ lnn
Tδ
. (16)
On the other hand, using the fact that ∑i α(t)i = n, and ∑i α˜(t)i (v(t)i )2 = n we have
ρ
T
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
m
(t)
i p
(t)
i =
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
1− (v(t)i )2
)
α
(t)
i
= 1
T
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
α
(t)
i −
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
n
n∑
i=1
α
(t)
i (v
(t)
i )2 = −
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
n
n∑
i=1
( α˜i(t)
1− δ +
δ
1− δ
)
(v(t)i )2 + 1
= − 1
T
T∑
t=1
1
(1− δ)n
n∑
i=1
α˜i
(t)(v(t)i )2 +
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
(1− δ)n
n∑
i=1
δ(v(t)i )2) + 1
= − 11− δ + 1 +
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
(1− δ)n
n∑
i=1
δ(v(t)i )2
≥ − δ1− δ (17)
Combining (16) and (17), we get that for δ ∈ (0, 1/2), and T = ρ logn/((1− δ)δ2) = O(n logn/δ3)
∀i ∈ [n], (1− X̂ii) ≥ − δ(1− δ)2 −
2δ
1− δ −
ρ lnn
Tδ(1− δ)
X̂ii ≤ 1 + δ(1 + 4δ) + 2δ(1 + 2δ) + δ ≤ 1 + 8δ.
This completes the proof of part (b). It is also straightforward to see that in above analysis, a
(1 + δ) approximate eigenvalue method can also be used to get a similar guarantee with an extra
(1 + δ) factor loss in the objective value.
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Figure 7: The images on the left correspond to the original images and the images on the right
correspond to imperceptible adversarial examples within an `∞ radius of ε ≤ 0.09.
We remark that the larger dependence of ρ = O(n/δ) is needed to ensure that in each iteration
(v(t)i )2/ρ ≤ 1. If this condition is satisfied for ρ  n/δ, then the iteration bound is O(ρ logn)/δ2.
This also justifies the use of a more aggressive i.e., smaller choice of ρ in practice.
D Imperceptibility in the DCT basis and Training Certified `∞
Robust Networks
Adversarial Examples for CIFAR-10 images. We take a ResNet-32 network that has been
trained on the CIFAR-10 datasets via the PGD based method of [MMS+17] for robustness to
`∞ perturbations. We then generate imperceptible adversarial examples for the test images via
projected gradient ascent and an `∞ perturbation radius of ε = 0.09. See Figure 7 for a few of the
original images and the corresponding adversarial perturbations.
E Experimental Evaluation of MWU-based SDP Certification Al-
gorithm 2
In this section we empirically evaluate the effectiveness of our multiplicative weights based procedure
from Algorithm 2 for solving the general Quadratic Programming (QP) problem as defined in (9).
Recall that this corresponds to the following optimization problem:
Given a symmetric matrix M with ∀i ∈ [n] : Mii ≥ 0, max
x:‖x‖∞≤1
x>Mx. (18)
Recall that in our Algorithm 2 every iterations involves a single maximum eigenvalue computation,
for which we use an off the shelf subroutine from Python’s scipy package. In our implementation of
Algorithm 2 we add an early stopping condition if the dual value does not improve noticeably in
successive rounds. Recall that Proposition C.1 proves that this also gives a valid upper bound on
the primal SDP value.
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Figure 8: Comparison of the running time of Algorithm 2(left plot) with the MOSEK solver for
PSD matrices of varying sizes (n from 500 to 4500). The middle plot shows the SDP values output
by the two procedures. The right plot shows the relative error in the SDP value output by our
procedure as compared to the value output by the MOSEK solver.
We consider two scenarios, one where M is a positive semi-definite matrix (PSD) and the other
when M is a symmetric matrix with non-negative diagonal entries. In each case we compare the
running time of our algorithm and the dual SDP value that it outputs with the corresponding values
obtained by using a state of the art SDP solver on the same instance. As a comparison for our
experiments we choose the SDP solver from the commercial optimization software MOSEK [ApS19].
For consistency, the comparison experiments were run on a single core of a Microsoft Surface Pro 3
tablet/computer with Intel Core i7-8650U CPU 1.90 GHz with 16GB RAM.
For the case when M is a PSD matrix, we generate a random n × n matrix A that contains
entries drawn from a standard normal distribution and set M = AA>, and renormalize the matrix
so that the trace is 1. We vary n from 500 to 4500 in increments of 250 (we used 5 random trials
for each value of n). Figure 8 shows the comparison of our algorithm with the SDP solver from
MOSEK for different values of n, averaged over the trials along with error bars. Notice that the
running time of our algorithm is an order of magnitude faster than the MOSEK solver particularly
for larger values of n, and furthermore the SDP values output are within 0.5% of the values output
by exactly optimizing the SDP via the MOSEK solver. We also include a table of the average run
times for a few different values of n in Table 2. We remark that other non-commercial SDP solvers
like CVXPY [DB16] timed out even for for n > 800.
A similar trend holds in Figure 9 where we consider randomly generated instances of the more
general QP problem (18). Here M is chosen to be a random symmetric n× n matrix with entries
drawn from the standard normal distribution and replace the diagonal entries of M with their
absolute values (so that the diagonals are non-negative).
Furthermore, unlike MOSEK, our procedure can scale to much larger values of n. As an example,
Table 3 shows the running time needed for our procedure to perform 200 iterations on PSD matrices
M of sizes ranging from 5000 to 2000. This demonstrates the scalability of our method for larger
datasets with higher dimensions. For scalability purposes, the experiments below were run on a
machine with access to a single GPU. Hence, the runtimes reported in Table 3 are not directly
comparable to those in Table 2.
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n Running time (in s) of our Algorithm 2 Running time (in s) of MOSEK
500 1.384± 0.324 8.444± 0.389
1000 5.631± 1.190 66.578± 5.432
2000 35.747± 8.960 620.615± 161.96
3000 143.07± 17.29 1387.69± 398.26
4000 351.81± 142.97 3453.95± 818.50
4500 518.56 ± 27.81 5579.93± 523.53
Table 2: The average time (in seconds) taken by Algorithm 2 and the MOSEK solver on random
PSD matrices for a few different sizes (n). The mean and standard deviation are computed over 5
independent runs for each value of n. See also Figure 8 for the plot based on more values of n taken
in increments of 250.
Figure 9: Comparison of the running time of Algorithm 2(left plot) with the MOSEK solver for
general symmetric matrices with non-negative diagonal entries of varying sizes (n). The middle plot
shows the SDP values output by the two procedures. The right plot shows the relative error in the
SDP value output by our procedure as compared to the value output by the MOSEK solver.
n Running time (in s) of our Algorithm 2
5000 104.92± 4.04
6000 156.29± 4.99
7000 213.80± 7.86
8000 272.83± 17.29
9000 346± 8.99
10000 378.70 ± 17.4
15000 1092.14 ± 103.79
20000 1801.08 ± 63.95
Table 3: The time (in seconds) taken by Algorithm 2 to perform 200 iterations on random PSD
matrices of varying sizes (n). The mean and standard deviation are computed over 5 independent
runs for each value of n.
We remark that our algorithm is specific to the Quadratic Programming SDP (which is a large
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class of problems in itself), while MOSEK SDP solver is a general purpose commercial SDP solver
based on interior-point methods that is more accurate. Our MWU-based algorithm (Algorithm 2)
for the Quadratic Programming SDP (12) gives much faster algorithms for approximately solving
the SDP (along with dual certificate of the upper bounds), while not compromising much on
approximation loss in the value. Hence the experiments are consistent with the running time
improvements suggested by the theoretical results in Section 3.1.
F Robust Projections for Audio Data in DCT basis
We now perform an empirical evaluation on audio data to demonstrate the existence of good
low-dimensional robust representations in the DCT basis. We consider the Mozilla CommonVoice
speech-to-text audio dataset (english en_1488h_2019-12-10)4 that was also considered by the
work of Carlini et al. [CW18] on audio adversarial examples. We use a standard approach (that
is also employed by [CW18]) to convert each audio file that may be of variable duration into a
representation in high dimensional space. Each element xi is a signed 16-bit value. First each audio
file is converted into a sequence of overlapping frames corresponding to time windows; and each
frame is represented as an n-dimensional vector of 16 bit values where n is given by the product of
the window size and the sampling rate (for the Commonvoice dataset n = 1200). Hence each audio
file corresponds to a sequence of frames, each of which is represented by an n dimensional vector.
Trial number Number of frames N ∞→ 2 norm Projection error %
1 421469 21.285 4.974
2 480773 22.899 5.056
3 447353 21.962 5.578
4 461034 24.439 5.247
5 438954 23.840 5.392
6 452581 22.902 5.025
Table 4: The table shows SDP upper bounds on ∞ → 2 norm for projection matrices of rank
r = 200 obtained by Algorithm 3 for 6 trials each with random 1000 audio samples from the
Mozilla Common Voice dataset. Each random sample of 1000 audio samples corresponds to roughly
N ≈ 10000 frames each of n = 1200 dimension in the DCT basis.
For our experiments, in each random trial we consider 1000 randomly chosen audio files, and
consider the data matrix (with n-dimensional columns) consisting of all the frames corresponding
to these audio files (and we consider 6 such random trials). We first use the sparse PCA based
heuristic (Algorithm 3 in Appendix C.1) to find a projection matrix of rank r = 200. We then use
Algorithm 2 to compute upper bounds on the ∞→ 2 operator norm of the projections matrices.
Table 4 shows the values of the operator norms certified by our algorithm for the projection matrices
that are found, along with the reconstruction/ projection error, expressed as a percentage. Notice
the obtained subspaces have operator norm values significantly smaller than
√
n ≈ 34.641.
4https://voice.mozilla.org/en/datasets
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